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Abstract
Grade ination or soft grading is a common feature of the educational
systems of many countries. In this paper I analyse grade ination in a setting
where students di¤er in social background, a rm decides its hiring strategy
and the schools grading policy can be targeted according to student type.
A targeted grade ination may exacerbate the job opportunities of disad-
vantaged students compared to advantaged students. This result emerges
since the school has an incentive in inating grades for a larger proportion
of students coming from an advantaged social background.
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- Praise, like gold and diamonds, owes its value only to its scarcity -
Samuel Johnson, 1751
1 Introduction
Grade ination arises when teachers award students with higher grades than
they deserve, leading to a higher concentration of students with top grades.1
The presence of grade ination makes it increasingly di¢ cult to distinguish
a students ability, both in evaluating university applications and in job re-
cruitment, and brings about potential distortions. Nowadays, the presence
of grade ination is a common feature in several educational systems. In the
United States for example, the evidence of grade ination has been recently
documented by Rojstaczer and Healy (2011), who collected historical data
on letter grades awarded by more than 200 four-year colleges and universi-
ties. Their results show the drastic rise in the share of A grades awarded
over the years.2 In Canada, Allahar and Côté (2007) show that the 52.6 %
of high-school graduates applying to universities in Ontario in 1995 had an
A average, and then this rose to 61% in 2004. Also in Ontario in 1995, the
9.4% of high school graduates reported an A+ average and it increased to
14.9% in 2003. In addition, the average grade of university applicants was
80% in 1997, and this percentage has steadily increased since then. In the
United Kingdom, graduates who obtain a rst-class honours rose from 7.7%
of total graduates in year 1996/97 to 14% in year 2008/09. For graduates
with an upper-second class honour, the percentage rose from 41.1% of total
1Grade ination literally refers to an increase of average grade of students over time.
However, in the related theoretical literature, grade ination refers to the fact a student
obtains a grade that over-estimate her own ability. A better denition for this phenomenon
could be soft grading. In order to be in line with the literature, along the paper I will
use the expression grade ination, but having in mind soft grading.
2In earlier contributions, Rosovsky and Hartley (2002) and Johnson (2003) survey the
empirical literature on grade ination in the U.S. The emergence of grade ination can
also be observed in Figlio and Lucas (2004), who analyse the impact of standard grades
in educational achievement in the Alachua County, Florida.
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graduates in year 1996/97 to 48% in year 2008/09 (Higher Education Sta-
tistic Agency). At the secondary school level (GCSE), Lodgen et al. (2009)
compared the results of 3000 fourteen-year-olds sitting a mathematics paper
containing questions identical to one set in 1976. He found similar overall
levels of attainment between the two cohorts. Thus teenagersmaths skills
are no better than 30 years ago, despite soaring GCSE passes. In Italy, the
analysis Stella reports one third of graduates achieved the highest grade
(110/110) in 2004 and 2005 (Modica, 2008). The established presence of
grade ination across countries requires the attention of policy makers. A
theoretical understanding of its consequences becomes necessary in order to
design an adequate policy intervention.
In this paper I examine the e¤ects of grade ination when this can be
targeted according to a students social background. Recent evidence shows
that students di¤ering in social origins are graded di¤erently. Prenzel et
al. (2005), Kiss (2010), and Lüdemann and Schwerdt (2010) show that im-
migrant or lower class children in Germany receive lower grades, and this
results holds even if one controls for the individual students intelligence.
Burgess and Greaves (2009), using data from British examination records,
compare grades obtained by students in central examinations with teacher
assessments of student abilities. They show that some ethnic minorities of
students are more likely to be underassessed by the teacher compared to
their performance in the central exam than white students. Wikström and
Wikström (2005) nd that private universities in Sweden, attended mainly
by privileged students, are more lenient in their grading policy.3 All this
evidence shows that the grades of students with an advantaged social back-
ground are more likely to be inated compared to students coming from a
disadvantaged social background. I will refer to the grade ination that can
be given di¤erently to students with di¤erent social origins as targeted
3An opposite e¤ect is found by Himmler and Schwager (2012), who exploit Dutch school
data, nding that schools with a higher proportion of disadvantaged students tend to set
lower standards.
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grade ination.
I consider a signalling game in a static setting, with one rm and one
school as players, where students di¤er both in ability (high or low) and so-
cial background (advantaged or disadvantaged). In the model, a students so-
cial background represents her family environment, household income, neigh-
bourhood, peer e¤ects and ethnic origins. I assume that students with an
advantaged social background are more likely to have high ability, this due
to the inuences of a more adequate environment to develop skills and by
a stronger parental and social pressure about life achievement. The school
aims to maximise the job opportunities of its students and appoint them a
grade in a school-leaving exam. In the model, a grade is inated if the school
gives a high grade to a low-ability student. The assumption of targeted grade
ination implies that the school can di¤erentiate grading according to a stu-
dents social background, so that, for instance, it may inate, with a certain
proportion, the grades of advantaged students and with a di¤erent propor-
tion the grades of disadvantaged students. After attending school, students
apply for a position at the rm. The rm observes the studentsgrades and
social backgrounds, the grading policy adopted by the school, and wants to
hire only high-ability students. Thus the rm forms a belief on a students
ability according to distribution of ability in the advantaged and disadvan-
taged population. In this sense, the model can be considered of statistical
discrimination, according to which an employer prefers a workers type since
is believed as more productive.4
In the analysis, I show the e¤ects of targeted grade ination by comparing
this policy with the alternative case in which the school cannot di¤erentiate
the grading according to students social origins (untargetedgrade ination)
The results suggest that optimally targeted grade ination may exacerbate
4See Arrow (1973), in which discrimination emerges by the relationship between the
employersbelief of a workers productivity and his or her actual productivity. Develop-
ment of this strand are Coate and Loury (1993), Moro and Norman (2003, 2004), and
Norman (2003, inter alia).
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the di¤erences in job opportunities between advantaged and disadvantaged
students, as more advantaged students have inated grades than in the un-
targeted case. Intuitively, the fact that advantaged students are more likely
to have high ability provides an incentive for the school to inate grades
for a greater proportion of low-ability students with advantaged background.
This result is in line with the empirical evidence showing that students com-
ing from an advantaged background are more likely to obtain high grades,
irrespective of their ability (Prenzel et al., 2005, Kiss, 2010, Lüdemann and
Schwerdt, 2010, Burgess and Greaves, 2009, and Wikström and Wikström,
2005). The results are also consistent with the empirical evidence accord-
ing to which social background inuences studentsjob opportunities. For
instance, Glyn and Salverda (2000) and Berthoud and Blekesaune (2006)
show that a disadvantaged social background negatively a¤ects the chance
of nding a job in OECD countries and the United Kingdom, respectively.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briey
surveys some of the related literature. The model is presented in Section
3, and Section 4 examines the main results. Section 5 extends the analysis
to the case with school competition, with Section 6 providing concluding
remarks.
2 Related literature
The economic literature has only recently taken on interest in grade ina-
tion, with some noteworthy contributions. Yang and Yip (2003) present a
model where universities have an incentive to inate grades and they mutu-
ally reinforce each others practise, thus determining a competitive e¤ect in
grade ination. This is due to the fact that each university does not consider
the collective reputation of graduates, but is willing to help some of its own
low-ability students by inating their grades, which leads to a free-riding
problem. Popov and Bernhardt (2013) develop a similar model to Yang and
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Yip (2003) to identify the increase over time in the quantity of good jobs as a
driving force of grade ination. They also extend the analysis by considering
students with varying social skills.
Chan et al. (2007) develop a signalling model where rms observe the stu-
dentsgrade but are not aware of their ability and the proportion of talented
ones in the population of students. This gives rise to an incentive to help
some low ability students by giving them good grades. They also show that
when the average quality of students among schools is correlated, soft grades
are strategic complements, and thus inating schools mutually reinforce each
others practices. Ehlers and Schwager (2012) modies the analysis of Chan
et al. (2007) by introducing a reputational element. They add a second co-
hort of graduates that arrives on the labor market when the rst cohort has
already revealed their true ability and therefore the schools grading policy.
The reputation e¤ect may shrink the level of grade ination.
Bar et al. (2012) examine the recent policy of putting grades in context,
according to which American colleges can reveal the distribution of grades
in di¤erent disciplines to employers, in order to prevent the distortion in in-
formation caused by grade ination. Accordingly, they propose a framework
where students can choose di¤erent courses and the university can vary grad-
ing standards according to the course. They show that, when information
on grading policies is provided only to students, some of them become more
attracted to leniently graded courses. On the other hand, if the information
is provided to both students and employers, some students choose the strictly
graded courses and some choose the leniently graded courses.
The main di¤erence between these papers and my analysis is that the
di¤erences in studentssocial background and grade ination is targeted ac-
cording to a student type.5 My analysis is mostly related to Schwager (2012),
5The paper is also related to the theoretical literature on educational standards, which
examines the criteria adopted by schools in evaluating students. Costrell (1994) considers
a policymaker who maximises social welfare under the assumption that utility-maximising
students choose whether to meet the standard, thus leading to the fact that earnings
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who develops a labour matching model with grade ination and student dif-
fering in social background. In his paper, students are matched with rms
o¤ering di¤erent kinds of jobs, according to the grade and the expected abil-
ity. Regardless of social background, it is possible that mediocre students
receive a high grade caused by grade ination. Also, the high-ability stu-
dents from advantaged backgrounds may benet from grade ination since
this shields them from the competition on the part of able and disadvan-
taged students. Compared to this analysis, I share the same assumptions
on the distributions of ability with di¤ering social backgrounds, but Schwa-
ger (2012) (i) focuses on the matching between workers and rms, whereas
I do not consider the matching in the labour market, and (ii) assumes the
same degree of grade ination along di¤erent social class, whereas I assume
that the school may target its grading policy. More importantly, in Schwa-
ger (2012) grade ination is a parameter, while in the present paper grade
ination is endogenously determined. Given the di¤erent framework, in my
results disadvantaged students may in fact benet from the presence of grade
ination.
are an endogenous function of educational achievement. The welfare analysis shows that
more egalitarian policymakers set lower standards. Betts (1998) instead argues that an
egalitarian policy maker might prefer higher standards than would a policy maker whose
goal was to maximize the sum of earnings. The result is based on the assumption of
heterogeneous ability among workers. As a consequence, a rise in educational standards
will increase the earnings of both the most-able and the least-able workers. The only
workers whose earnings fall are those workers who after the increase fail to continue meeting
the standard. Himmler and Schwager (2012) extend the Costrell (1994)s analysis by
assuming that, in addition to the standard, also the social origin a¤ects the wage earned
by graduates. For a given standard, students from disadvantaged backgrounds obtain a
lower wage than students from other social classes. Schools with a disadvantaged student
body set lower standards than other schools, even if the abilities of the disadvantaged
students are identical to those of others. Standards are inated in this way because the
wage discount experienced by graduates from unfavourable backgrounds depresses the
return to learning e¤ort for these students. They are thus less willing to satisfy any given
standard than students from an average social background.
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3 The framework
For simplicity, I abstract from student e¤ort and from competition across
schools, and I focus on the interplay between one school that grades students
and one rm interested in hiring students after school.6 All students attend
school and afterward apply for a job in the rm.
3.1 Students
I study an economy with a continuum of students, with measure normalised
to one. Students can have high (H) or low (L) ability and an advantaged
(a) or disadvantaged (d) social background. Social background is public
information, and can be seen as a bivariate measure of family environment,
income, neighbourhood, peer e¤ects, ethnic origins and so forth.7 The public
knowledge of social background seems plausible: in the real world, school
teachers and personnel managers can tell the student/job candidates social
background through some information such as ethnic origins, name, address,
language style, manners, clothing, and so on.
I denote as  2 (0; 1) the proportion of advantaged students, and pa; pd 2
(0; 1) as the probability that an a or d student has high-ability, respectively. I
assume pa > pd, that is students with advantaged social background are more
likely to have high ability. This assumption can be justied as follows. Given
the same distribution of innate ability within a population with di¤ering
social backgrounds, an advantaged environment can foster development via
parental and peer pressure so that, on average, the overall abilityis likely
6In Section 5 I illustrate how the baseline model can be developed by introducing
competition between schools.
7Peer e¤ects arise if students learn better in a group of more able students. Relevant
empirical studies are, inter alia, Summers and Wolfe (1977), Henderson et al. (1978), Epple
et al. (2003) and Zimmer and Toma (2000). From a theoretical point of view, Arnott and
Rowse (1987), de Bartolome (1990) and Epple and Romano (1998) consider explicitly the
peer group e¤ect. In the present analysis the presence of peer-e¤ects is considered within
the background.
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to be higher for students with an advantaged background. The assumption is
in line with past research documenting that family and environmental factors
are major predictors of the individualsability (Cunha et al., 2006, Carneiro
and Heckman, 2003, Joshi and McCulloc, 2000).
3.2 School
The school prepares students for a nal exam, with equal teaching e¤ort
irrespective of the student type, and learns the students ability during the
period spent by a student at school, through their tests and assessments
results. The nal exam can be interpreted either as a grade for a nal test
or as the average grades among the school examinations. The possible exam
outcomes are a high (A) or a low (B) grade.
The school decides which grade to appoint each student type. I dene gji
2 [0; 1] ; where j 2 fH;Lg ; and i 2 fa; dg ; as the probability that the school
appoints an A grade to a ji student. I refer to grade inationwhen the
school appoints an L student with an A grade. The fact that the school can
di¤erentiate its grading according to a student background can be interpreted
in several ways. For instance, the school may track students of di¤erent social
origins, due to a di¤erent initial preparation. Another situation in which a
targeted grading policy may take place emerges in those school courses in
which studentsachievement can be assessed very subjectively, for example
in oral tests. In this case a grading policy being targeted according to student
types is easy to implement.
There is not a standard way of modeling school behaviour. In the eco-
nomic models of school (or university) competition, the number of enrolled
students or the overall amount of tuition fees enter in the school/university
objective function (Epple and Romano, 1998, Del Rey, 2001, De Fraja and
Iossa, 2002, Brunello and Rocco, 2008, Maldonado, 2008, Ferreyra, 2012,
inter alia). Other models propose a school objective function determined
by the average qualication (De Fraja and Landeras, 2006, De Fraja et al.,
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2010, Albornoz et al., 2011), the average and the variance of the qualication
(Ritzen et al., 1979), the quality of school (Epple et al., 2003 and 2006) and
the quality or the attendance in the case of a public school (Epple et al.,
2002).8 Here I assume that a school wants the maximum number of students
to be hired, and obtains a benet for each hired student. I denote as zi 2
[0; 1] ;  2 fA;Bg the probability that the rm hires a student according to
grade and social background (see the next paragraph).9 Therefore the school
objective function is as follows:
U =  [pabHa + (1  pa) bLa] za+ (1)
(1  ) [pdbHd + (1  pd) bLd] zd;
where bji is the benet that the school obtains from the hiring of a ji student.
I make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 bHa = bHd > bLa = bLd > 0.
In words, the school wants the maximum number of students to be hired
and values more the employment of an H student. Accordingly, (i) each
students employment increases the school reputation as an e¤ective insti-
tution for obtaining a job and (ii) the school obtains a higher benet from
the hiring of H students which ensures the schools credibility to the rm.
It is important to stress that, according to Assumption 1, the school has no
preferences whatsoever about a students social background.10
8Some recent contributions (Albornoz et al., 2011, Donze and Gunnes, 2011) rely on
the goal theory(Covington, 2000), according to which achievement goals inuence the
quality, timing and appropriateness of the students engagement in their own learning.
This e¤ort together with innate ability a¤ect the students accomplishments. As a con-
sequence, parents and teachers play a key role in inuencing the studentsachievement
goals and, in turn, their e¤ort.
9As will be clear shortly, rms cannot observe a students ability and use the grade as
a signal of it.
10In Section 4.3 I consider di¤erent assumptions about the schools preferences.
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3.3 Firm
The rm evaluates to hire some of the students after the school period by
observing their nal grade and social background. The public knowledge of
social background seems plausible: in the real world, a personnel manager can
probably tell the job candidates social background through some information
such as ethnic origins, name, address, language style, manners, clothing, and
so on. Also, the rm is fully aware of the schools grading policy. The
latter assumption reects the situations in the real world in which either
(i) an educational institution claims its own grading policy, (ii) the grading
policy is public information due to reputation e¤ects or (iii) some policy
intervention induces them to reveal the distribution of grades, like putting
grades in contextin the United States (see Bar et al., 2012). After observing
a grade, the rm has a belief, consistent with Bayesrule, about a student
ability, conditional on all the information it has: the students grade, the
distribution of ability according to the students social background and the
school strategy.
The rm hires with probability zi a student with background i 2 fa; dg
who nished school with grade  2 fA;Bg and o¤ers a single job type. Also,
I assume that ability of employees determines the rms prot entirely. In
particular, each high- and low-ability employee yields a net prot of  > 0
and  1, respectively. The assumption of a negative prot by hiring a L
student can be interpreted in many ways: low-ability employees may have a
marginal productivity which is lower than salary cost. In addition, the rm
may want to lay o¤ an unproductive employee but this action still comes at
a cost, e.g. industrial disputes, wasted training costs and time, and so on.
Given these assumptions, the expected rms prot for a student ji is given
by:
F =  (H jgji; pi )   (L jgji; pi ) ;
where  (j jgji; pi ) is the belief of the rm about the ability of a student with
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social background i and whose grade depends on the school grading policy,
gji. According to the Bayes rule, the rms beliefs about a students ability
are dened as follows.
Denition 1 The rms beliefs on the studentsability which are consistent
with the Bayesrule are
 (H jgji; pi ) = pigHi
pigHi + (1  pi) gLi ;
 (L jgji; pi ) = (1  pi) gLi
pigHi + (1  pi) gLi ;
(2)
Finally, I dene J 2 [0; 1) as labour demand. The fact that J cannot
cover all of the students rules out the unrealistic case where the job market
is cleared, and has important consequences on the behaviour of the school.
As will be clear below, given the limited amount of job placements and
Assumption 1, the school will adopt a grading policy such that none of the L
students obtain a job at the expenses of anH student. In turn, in equilibrium
zi will equal 0 or 1 for all student types.
3.4 The game
Figure 1 summarises the timing of the game. Nature draws the student
types, then the school grades the student in the nal exam. Finally, all the
students apply for a job in the rm, that decides whether to hire or not each
job candidate.
Figure 1. The game timing
Stage 1. Nature Stage 2. School Stage 3. Firm
4 student types: chooses the chooses whether
H or L with a or ! grade to give to ! hiring or not each
d background. each student type. student.
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The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which is a com-
bination of students, school and rm strategies and rm beliefs where all
the agents maximise their payo¤. For each grade, the rm must maximise
its expected prot, given its belief and the school strategy. Labour demand
requires that the number of hired students is at most J . In turn the school
chooses its grading strategy in order to maximise its expected payo¤, given
the set of students, the rms strategy and labour demand J .11
4 Results
4.1 The baseline problem
In this section I show the results of the baseline model. First notice that, since
a student who scored B has low ability with probability 1; then the rm will
never hire one of them, so that zBi = 0 for i 2 fa; dg. Indeed while the school
may want to inate the grade of a low-ability student in order to increase
the number of students who obtain a job, it would never appoint a B to a
high-ability student. This simplies the exposition of the results and allows
me to focus on A students. By the same token, it is always better for the
school to confer a grade A to an H student, as this unambiguously raises the
payo¤ of both the school and the rm. Therefore, in all the possible scenario
the probability of an H student to obtain an A is gHi = 1 for i 2 fa; dg :
The rms expected payo¤ of hiring an A student with social background
i according to the beliefs (2) is
F (gLi;A; pi) =
pi  (1  pi) gLi
pi + (1  pi) gLi : (3)
The rm hires from a population of students if its expected payo¤ is nonnega-
tive, F (gLi;A; pi)  0. Assume for a moment that labour demand is J = 1:
11Notice that the school has complete information about the rms behaviour, therefore
it is not necessary to determine its beliefs.
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For every i 2 fa; dg and pi  11+ ; the rms expected payo¤ (3) is positive
for gLi = 1: For pi < 11+ ; the rms expected payo¤ (3) is nonnegative for
gLi  pi(1 pi) ; so that the school strategy is gLi =
pi
(1 pi) . Hence the threshold
point 1
1+
is a function of the rms benet from hiring an H student, .
The higher the benet, the higher the rms expected payo¤ by hiring an A
student. Therefore the rm tends to hire more A students when  is high,
and in turn, the school more likely inates the studentsgrades.
Consider now the case in which job positions are limited, J < 1. Since
the school prefers that an H rather than an L student obtains a job, it will
inate grades at most for the amount of labour demand net to the share of
H students, denoted as
  pa + pd (1  ) ; (4)
so that the remainder of labour demand is J   : This ensures that none
of the L students would obtain a job opportunity at the expenses of an H
student. Finally, if the expected prots are positive from hiring both an a
and a d students, then the rm can compare the two expected prot:
F (gLa;A; pa) =
pa  gLa (1  pa)
pa + gLa (1  pa) 7
pd  gLd (1  pd)
pd + gLd (1  pd) = 
F (gLd;A; pd) :
(5)
Given Assumption 1, the school strategy ensures that the maximum num-
ber of students would be hired and that all the students who scored A are
going to obtain a job. This is due to the following reason. Since the school
favours H over L students, it will never choose a strategy such that an L
student obtains a job at the expenses of an H student. In other words, grade
ination cannot go against the job opportunities of H students. This may
happen for instance if the number of students who scored A is higher than J .
In this case some of the H students may not be hired, implying that some of
the A students did not obtain a job. Therefore the schools strategy to give
14
A at most to J  students ensures that all the A students will receive a job
o¤er. Of course, if the number of open positions is lower than the number of
H students, then multiple equilibria arise, as the school would be indi¤erent
to give A to all H students only, or to give A to a number of H students that
covers J (irrespective of a student social background).12 In both cases, not
all H students will obtain a job, but only a number J . The discussion can
be summarised in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For J 2 [; 1) ; all the students who scored A will obtain a job.
Lemma 1 implies that the rms strategy is zAi = min fJ; 1g always. This
is due to the fact that the school inates grades in such a way that the rms
prot is always nonnegative.
A situation where J <  is not very interesting as does not represent
what happens in the real world. Thus from now on I will focus on the case
in which labour demand is larger than the number of high ability students,
according to the following assumption.
Assumption 2  < J < 1:
4.2 Untargeted vs targeted grade ination
As a benchmark, rst I will show the situation in which grade ination can-
not be targeted, then I will compare this with the case with targeted grade
ination. With untargeted grade ination, the grading policy is the same for
both populations. The characteristics of the equilibria can be summarised as
follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold, and grade ination is
untargeted.
12The last situation may be dened as grade deation equilibrium, since not all the
H students obtain a high grade.
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 Pooling equilibrium. For pd  1+1 ; grade ination is given with the
same proportion to a and d students, and the probability of obtaining a
job is the same for a and d students.
 Separating equilibrium. For pd < 1+1, grade ination is given in
proportion to more a than d students, and the probability of obtaining
a job is greater for a rather than d students.
Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 2 shows the equilibria in the parameter space (pd; pa). If the distri-
bution of ability is very high in both population

pd >
1
+1

, the rm believes
that it is very likely that the ability both of advantaged and disadvantaged
students is high. The school then inates their grades as much as it can
according to J; in order to maximise the chance of a job for H rather than
L students. The result is a pooling equilibrium, in which social background
does not matter in order to obtain a job.
Things change when the distribution of ability is low in the disadvantaged
population

pd <
1
+1

. Here, there are two subcases, according to which the
advantaged population has a high number of H students

pa  1+1 > pd

or
not

1
+1
> pa > pd

, and where the results are quantitatively similar. Given
the lower expectations about the ability of d students, the school inates
grades to a lower proportion of them. This leads to a separating equilibrium,
in which a students are more likely to obtain a job than d students. The re-
sults obtained in Proposition 1 are qualitatively similar to Schwager (2012),
who considers untargeted grade ination, di¤erences in studentssocial back-
ground and matching in the labour market.
Suppose now that grade ination can be targeted. This Assumption is
in line with some recent evidence showing di¤erent behaviour of teachers
according to students social background (Burgess and Greaves, 2009, in the
UK, and Prenzel et al., 2005, Kiss, 2010 and Lüdemann and Schwerdt, 2010
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in Germany). The following proposition summarises the features of the equi-
libria.
Figure 2. Equilibria with positive grade ination
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Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold and the school can target
grade ination:
 Pooling equilibrium. For pd > 1+1 ; the results are the same as in
Proposition 1.
 Separating equilibrium. For pd < 1+1, the probability of obtaining
a job is higher for a than d students. Compared to the targeted case,
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an d student has a relatively lower probability of obtaining a job than
an a student.
Proof. See the appendix.
The results are qualitatively similar to the case with untargeted grade
ination, and the intuitive interpretation is much the same. The main dif-
ference is due to the fact that, in the separating equilibrium, the job oppor-
tunities of a students will increase compared to the untargeted case, with
the e¤ect of exacerbating class di¤erences. In other words, a student with
disadvantaged background has relatively less job opportunities compared to
an advantaged student than in the untargeted case. Indeed, it is optimal
for the school to inate grades for a higher proportion of a than d students,
given their di¤erence in the ability distribution. The result is consistent with
the evidence showing that students coming from a disadvantaged background
have less job opportunities in the job market (Glyn and Salverda, 2000, and
Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2006, inter alia).
4.3 Di¤erent school objectives
So far, the analysis has been carried out with the assumption that the school
did not have any redistributive aim whatsoever in the studentsjob oppor-
tunities. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy to consider whether these results are
robust when the school has di¤erent objectives. In what follows I analyse a
school with preferences over social background. In the two scenarios consid-
ered, the school still favours H over L students to keep a good reputation
towards the rm, hence Lemma 1 still holds.
First I examine a situation in which the school is interested in helping the
job opportunities of disadvantaged students. I will call it a redistributive
school. Accordingly, I assume:
Assumption 3 bHd > bHa > bLd > bLa:
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In the attempt to increase the job opportunities of disadvantaged stu-
dents, the redistributive school can design its grading policy by keeping a
su¢ ciently high grade ination for a students that makes d students to be
preferred in the job market, i.e., hiring a d students ensures a higher expected
payo¤. However, a lower grade ination implies that a lower proportion of
d students receive an A and in turn a job. Therefore the results obtained
in Proposition 2 hold even when a school has redistributive intentions. This
discussion is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 2 and 3 hold: Then the results are the
same as in the case in which the school has not redistributive intentions
(Proposition 2).
Proof. See the appendix.
Consider next a school (an elitistschool) willing to favour advantaged
rather than disadvantaged students. A school may prefer hiring advantaged
students for pecuniary reasons. For instance it may happen in those coun-
tries, like the United States, in which wealthy alumni would give donations
to their college. Indeed evidence shows that students who receive loans or
nancial aid are less likely in the future to make a gift in the future (Meer
and Rosen, 2011). The behaviour of an elitist school can be implemented as
follows:
Assumption 4 bHa > bHd > bLa > bLd:
Even in this case the results do not change compared to the case with no
redistributive aims. The reason is the following. In order to favour advan-
taged students, the elitist school may grade in such a way to keep a su¢ -
ciently high grade ination for d students that makes a students be preferred
in the job market, i.e., hiring a a students ensures a higher expected payo¤.
However, inating less the grades of a students (i) reduces the proportion
of a students who obtain an A, and (ii) it is not really necessary given the
assumption pa > pd .
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Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 2 and 4 hold. Then the results do not
change compared to the case in which the school has no preferences for a
students social background (Proposition 2).
Proof. See the appendix.
The results of Proposition 3 and 4 are due to the fact that the school is
limited in their use of grade ination by the risk of damaging the H students
of the less favoured population.
5 School competition
In this section, I consider the e¤ects of competition among schools on my
ndings about grade ination. In this setting, I assume that students can
decide in which school to be enrolled, and they would prefer to attend the
school that increases their chance of obtaining a job. I show that the essential
results carry over to settings with competition.
5.1 Symmetric oligopoly
First assume a competitive school market in which n  2 schools operate
with no entry of other competitors. A school has a payo¤ according to
Assumption 1, i.e., it prefers that an H rather than an L student obtains
a job, and it is indi¤erent to student social background. In a competitive
setting, Assumption 1 implies that a school prefers to enroll H rather than
L students, as they will give to the school a higher payo¤ in the case they
are employed.
Each school can admit a number of students of at most hu 2 (0; 1),
identical for each school, i.e.
Assumption 5
P
u hu = 1; hu = hs > 0; for all u; s = 1; 2; ::; n; u 6= s:
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This is an important assumption, since a school grading strategy cannot in-
crease its own capacity but only helps to fulll the maximum number of
admitted students. In other words, the maximum supply of enrollment is
xed. Each school decides whether or not to inate grades and, if so, the
amount of grade ination to provide.
Begin with the case in which labour demand is lower than the number of
H students, J < . Given the limited number of expected positions and the
fact that a school prefers to enroll H rather than L students, the school will
favour the former over the latter by not inating grades.
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 1 and 5 hold and J  . Then each school
never inates grades and the rm is indi¤erent to a students social back-
ground.
Consider next J > : In this case a school may consider inating grades
in order to increase the number of its students by enrolling some of the L
students. There are two possible cases. In the rst, assume  < hu: If all
but one schools inate grades, then the non-inating school will attract all
the H students, and the rm would hire those students only. If n  1 schools
do not inate grades while one school deviates, then all H students would
attend one of the n  1 schools, in which there is always room for them since
 < hu; so that the payo¤ of the school that inates grades will be zero.
Therefore even in this case, none of the school inates grades.
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and  < hu. Then each school never
inates grades and the rm is indi¤erent to a students social background.
In the second case, assume hu <  < J: If n   1 schools inate grades
and one school deviates, it will attract the H students according to its own
size hu, and since a school prefers to enroll H over L students, it will increase
its own payo¤. Hence even in this case a situation in which all the schools
inate grades is never an equilibrium.
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Similarly, if n  1 schools do not inate grades and a school deviates, but
  (n  1)hu; then all the H students nd a placement in the other schools,
so that the inating-grades school obtains a zero payo¤. Therefore this is
not an equilibrium, since none of the schools are willing to inate grades.
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and hu <   (n  1)hu. Then
each school never inates grades and the rm is indi¤erent to a students
social background.
On the other hand, if some of these H students cannot nd a placement
in the other schools, i.e.,  > (n  1)hu; they attend the school who inated
grades. Indeed, an H student will score A with certainty for Lemma 1, since
even with competition, a school who inates grades still will do that in such
a way to favour her over an L student. In this case, the school compares the
payo¤ of deviation with the payo¤ of no grade ination:

n
bH > [  (n  1)hu] bH + [gLa (1  pa) + gLd (1  ) (1  pd)] bL; (6)
so that two situations may occur:
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and (n  1)hu <  < J:
1. If inequality (6) holds, in equilibrium all schools will not inate grades;
2. If inequality (6) does not hold, in equilibrium one school inates grades
and the n  1 schools will not inate grades.
Note that, in point 2 of Proposition 5, the deviation strategy would in-
crease the payo¤ of all the other non-inating-grades schools, since they
would ll their studentscapacity with H students. Therefore none of the
other schools has an incentive in deviating, which ensures stability to the
equilibrium. More important, for the case analysed in point 2 of Proposition
5, the equilibria depicted above in the analysis with no school competition
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hold for the population of students net of theH students attending the school
that gives grade ination. Hence the results analysed in the non-competitive
case may apply as a benchmark for some market with symmetric competition.
5.2 Asymmetric duopoly
The result depicted in the previous section strictly depends on the assump-
tion of equal size of all schools. To understand why, consider this second
competitive model. Suppose for simplicity a school duopoly in which one
school (denoted by 1) is larger and the number of H students is higher than
the size of the smaller school (denoted by 2), i.e.:
Assumption 6 h1 > h2 > 0; h1 + h2 = 1:
In cases J < ; J >  > h1; and J > h2 > ; both schools never
inate grades and the rm is indi¤erent to a students social background.
The argumentations of these results are the same described in the symmetric
market.
Consider now J > h1 >  > h2: If school 1 does not inate grades, the
school 2s dominant strategy is not to inate grades. Indeed school 1 may
enroll all the H students and thus leaving school 2 with L students only.
However, if school 2 does not inate grades, then school 1 compares the
payo¤ of inating grades with the payo¤ of no grade ination, i.e., inequality
(6) when n = 2:

2
bH > (  h2) bH + [gLa (1  pa) + gLd (1  ) (1  pd)] bL: (7)
Again, two equilibria may occur:
Proposition 6 Suppose Assumption 1 and 6 hold and J > h1 >  > h2:
1. If inequality (7) holds, in equilibrium both schools will not inate grades;
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2. If inequality (7) does not hold, in equilibrium school 1 inates grades
and the school 2 does not inate grades.
In particular for the case illustrated in point 2 of Proposition 6, the equi-
libria depicted above in the analysis with no school competition hold for the
population of students net of the H students attending school 2. Similarly
to point 2 of Proposition (5), the results analysed in the non-competitive
case may apply as a benchmark in some market with asymmetric school
competition.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has examined the e¤ects of grade ination when it can be tar-
geted according to studentssocial background. In line with the empirical
evidence, I have shown that grade ination is given to a higher proportion
of advantaged students. This exacerbates the job opportunities of disadvan-
taged students compared to advantaged students. I assume that the school
has not preferences on a student social background, but the results hold also
by relaxing this assumption. Also, the analysis is robust to some extent in
markets with school competition.
A possible development may be to evaluate the relationship between grade
ination and school reputation (see Ehlers and Schwager, 2012) when stu-
dents di¤er in social background. In this direction, it would be necessary to
modify the framework in a either repeated or dynamic setting, and to relax
the assumption of perfect information about the school strategy. An interest-
ing follow up paper could analyse how grade ination a¤ects studentse¤ort
incentives. For instance, does more grade ination create perverse incentives
for the students to put forth e¤ort? The relation between grade ination and
studentse¤ort is left for future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider J = 1: For pa > pd > 1+1 ; the equilibrium would be
gLa = gLd = 1; (8)
thus all the students obtain a job. Plugging (8) into (5), hiring an a student
always gives a higher expected prot. When pa + pd (1  ) < J < 1; this
strategy may lead L students to obtain a job at the expense of H students.
Therefore the school inates grades to a number of students that covers
labour demand net to the share of H, i.e.:
gLa = gLd =
J   
 (1  pa) + (1  pd) (1  ) ; (9)
so that an L and a student has the same chance of obtaining a job than an
L and d student. Plugging (9) into (5), hiring an a student gives a higher
expected payo¤ always.
Consider next pa > 1+1 > pd and J = 1: The optimal school strategy is
gLa = 1; gLd =
pd
1  pd : (10)
This strategy cannot be implemented with the assumption of untargeted
grade ination, as in equilibrium the proportion of grade ination di¤er across
students populations. In this case, the best grading policy is determined
according to the distribution of ability in the d population. Otherwise, if the
university applies the optimal level of grade ination for a students, none of
the d students would be hired, as the rms expected prot from hiring them
would be negative, given the excessive grade ination. Thus by adopting this
policy, a and L students would obtain a job over d and H students, going
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against Assumption 1. Thus the school strategy is
gLa = gLd =
pd
1  pd : (11)
When  < J < 1; this strategy may lead L students to obtain a job at
the expense of H students. Thus the school provides grade ination for the
proportion of the expected available positions for low ability students, i.e.:
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) : (12)
The strategy in equilibrium is
gLa = gLd =
pd
1  pd
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) : (13)
Consider next 1
+1
> pa > pd and J = 1: The optimal school strategy is
gLa =
pa
1  pa ; gLd =
pd
1  pd : (14)
As in the previous case, the school strategy is based on the distribution of
ability in the d population, hence its strategy is
gLa = gLd =
pd
1  pd : (15)
When  < J < 1; the school strategy becomes:
gLa = gLd =
pd
1  pd
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) : (16)
Plugging (16) into (5), hiring an a student gives a higher expected prot
always.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Consider J = 1: For pa > pd > 1+1 ; the equilibrium would be the same
as in Proposition 1. Indeed in this case, it is optimal to provide the same
proportion of grade ination to each population, even if the school may target
it di¤erently. For pa > 1+1 > pd and J = 1; the school strategy is
gLa = 1; gLd =
pd
1  pd : (17)
When  < J < 1; this strategy may lead L students to obtain a job at the
expense of H students. To avoid this, the school provides grade ination for
the proportion of the expected available positions for low ability students.
Thus the result would be
gLa =
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) ;
gLd =
pd
1  pd
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) :
(18)
Then the rm compares the expected prots from hiring a d or an a student.
Plugging (17) into (5) yields:
pa  (1  pa)
pa + (1  pa) > 0: (19)
For 1
+1
> pa > pd and J = 1, the school strategy is
gLa =
pa
1  pa ; gLd =
pd
1  pd : (20)
For  < J < 1; this strategy may lead L students to obtain a job at the
expense of H students. Hence the school provides grade ination in the
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proportion of the available position for low ability students, i.e.:
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) :
Thus strategy in equilibrium is
gLa =
pa
1  pa
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) ;
gLd =
pd
1  pd
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) :
(21)
Finally, the rm compares the expected prots from hiring a d or an a stu-
dent. Plugging (20) into (5) yields:
F (gLd;A; pd) = 
F (gLa;A; pa) = 0: (22)
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider rst J = 1: For pa > pd  1+1 ; the school may try to help d
students by fully inating grades to a students (gLa = 1) and keeping the
level of grade ination of d students in such a way than the rms expected
prot is higher by hiring one of them:
pd  gLd (1  pd)
pd + gLd (1  pd)  pa  (1  pa) : (23)
Solving for gLd yields
gLd =
pd (1  pa)
pa (1  pd) < 1: (24)
However, given the distribution of ability in the disadvantaged population,
the rm would hire all the A and d students, irrespective of the school strat-
egy. Hence the school best strategy is gLd = 1, since this raises the number
of d students who obtain a job. For pa > 1+1 > pd; the rms expected prot
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is still higher by hiring a d student for gLd =
pd(1 pa)
pa(1 pd) . However, comparing
this level with the optimal level in Proposition 2, it emerges that
pd (1  pa)
pa (1  pd) 
pd
1  pd ; for pa 
1
+ 1
(25)
Therefore it is optimal for the school to adopt gLd =
pd
1  pd : For
1
+1
> pa >
pd; the rms expected prot is higher by hiring a d student for:
pd  gLd (1  pd)
pd + gLd (1  pd) 
pa  gLa (1  pa)
pa + gLa (1  pa) : (26)
Solving for gLd yields
gLd =
gLapd (1  pa)
pa (1  pd) : (27)
Substituting gLa =
pa
1 pa (the optimal level of grade ination for a students)
yields gLd =
pd
1 pd . The results for  < J < 1 follow as in Proposition 2:
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider rst J = 1: For pa > pd  1+1 ; the school may try to help a
students by fully inating grades to d students (gLd = 1) and keeping the
level of grade ination of a students in such a way than the rms expected
prot is higher by hiring one of them:
pa  gLa (1  pa)
pa + gLa (1  pa)  pd  (1  pd) : (28)
Solving for gLa yields
gLa =
pa (1  pd)
pd (1  pa) > 1: (29)
Hence in the case the school best strategy is gLa = 1. For pa > 1+1 > pd; the
school may try to help a students by keeping the level of grade ination of
a students in such a way that the rms expected prot is higher by hiring
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one of them:
pa  gLa (1  pa)
pa + gLa (1  pa) 
pd  gLd (1  pd)
pd + gLd (1  pd) : (30)
Solving for gLa yields
gLa =
gLdpa (1  pd)
pd (1  pa) : (31)
Substituting gLd =
pd
1 pd (the optimal level of grade ination for d students)
yields gLa =
pa
1 pa . However, given the distribution of ability in the advan-
taged population, the rm would hire all the A and a students, irrespective
of the school strategy. Therefore the optimal school strategy is gLa = 1:
For pa > pd > 1+1 ; the rms expected prot is still higher by hiring an a
student for gLa =
pagLd(1 pd)
pd(1 pa) : Substituting gLd =
pd
1 pd (the optimal level of
grade ination for d students) yields gLa =
pa
1 pa . The results for  < J < 1
follow as in Proposition 2:
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